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Abstract
This study examines the eects of bottleneck congestion and an optimal time-varying con-
gestion toll on the spatial structure of cities. We develop a model in which heterogeneous
commuters choose departure times from home and residential locations in a monocentric city
with a bottleneck located between a central downtownand an adjacent suburb. We thendemon-
strate that commuters sort themselves temporally and spatially on the basis of their value of
travel time and their flexibility. Furthermore, we reveal that introducing an optimal congestion
toll alters the urban spatial structure, which contrasts with the previous literature. We further
demonstrate through an example that congestion tolling can cause the city to physically expand
outward, which helps rich commuters but hurts poor commuters.
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1 Introduction
Traditional residential location models describe the spatial structures of cities and their evolution
based on the trade-o between land rent and commuting costs (Alonso, 1964; Mills, 1967; Muth,
1969). Traditional and subsequent studies have successfully predicted the empirically observed
patterns of residential location (e.g., the spatial distribution of rich and poor) and the eects
of assorted urban policies.1 However, most previous studies describe trac congestion using
static flow congestion models. Their use renders these models inappropriate for dealing with
peak-period trac congestion and for examining the eects of measures intended to alleviate it
(e.g., time-varying congestion tolls, flextime, staggered work hours).
The bottleneck model can adequately describe peak-period congestion and how commuters
choose their departure times from home (Vickrey, 1969; Hendrickson and Kocur, 1981; Arnott
et al., 1990b, 1993). Its simple, eective framework for studying the ecacy of various measures
to alleviate peak-period congestion has inspired numerous extensions and modifications. The
bottleneck model, however, cannot be easily applied in the context of the traditional residential
location model, as stated by Ross and Yinger (2000). Therefore, few studies have developed a
model to describe how commuters choose where they live and when they depart from home.
Arnott (1998) is the first and the most successful attempt to incorporate the bottleneck model
into a residential location model. This study considered a (discrete space) monocentric city
comprising two areas—a downtown and a suburb—connected by a single roadwith a bottleneck.
He showed that imposing an optimal congestion toll without redistributing its revenues aects
neither commuting costs nor commuters’ residential locations. This result fundamentally diers
from the results given by traditional models with static flow congestion, which predict that
cities become denser with congestion pricing (e.g., Kanemoto, 1980; Wheaton, 1998; Anas et al.,
1998). However, Arnott (1998) assumed that commuters are homogeneous although it has been
established that optimal congestion tolling changes commuting costs in bottleneck models with
heterogeneous commuters (e.g., Arnott et al., 1992, 1994; van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011). That
is, the eects of congestion tolling in the bottleneck model with heterogeneous commuters can
fundamentally dier from those in the model with homogeneous commuters.
This study extends themodel developed byArnott (1998) to consider commuter heterogeneity
and a continuous space monocentric city with a bottleneck located between a central downtown
and an adjacent suburb. We systematically analyzed our model using the properties of com-
plementarity problems that define the equilibrium.2 Our analysis shows that commuters sort
themselves both temporally and spatially on the basis of their value of travel time and their
flexibility.
In addition, this study investigates the eects of an optimal time-varying congestion toll (i.e.,
alleviating peak-period congestion) on the urban spatial structure. We show that introducing a
congestion toll (with and without redistributing its revenues) changes commuters’ commuting
costs, thereby altering their spatial distribution. To concretely demonstrate the eects of conges-
1Fujita (1989), Glaeser et al. (2008), Fujita andThisse (2013), andDuranton andPuga (2015) provideddetailed overviews
of traditional residential location models. For the eects of congestion pricing, see Kanemoto (1980), Wheaton (1998),
and Anas et al. (1998). Recently, Brueckner (2007), Anas and Rhee (2007), Joshi and Kono (2009), Kono et al. (2008); Kono
and Joshi (2012), and Pines and Kono (2012) showed the eciency of urban policies to substitute for congestion pricing
(urban growth boundary, floor-to-area ratio regulations).
2As we show in Appendix A, the equilibrium defined by the complementarity problems coincides with that obtained
by the traditional bid-rent approach (Alonso, 1964; Fujita, 1989; Duranton and Puga, 2015).
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tion tolling, we analyzed the model for a case in which commuters with a high value of travel
time (rich commuters) are highly inflexible.3 This analysis indicates that congestion tolling re-
duces the commuting costs of suburban commuters, thereby increasing the suburban population.
Furthermore, the population increase in the suburb causes the city to physically expand outward
and induces higher density and land rent at suburban locations and lower density and land rent
at downtown locations. This finding contrasts not only with the standard results of traditional
location models with static flow congestion (congestion tolling results in a denser urban spatial
structure), but also with those of Arnott (1998) (tolling has no eect on urban spatial structure).
This implies that interactions among heterogeneous commuters change the eects of congestion
tolling on urban spatial structure. We further demonstrate that, although the optimal congestion
toll (without toll-revenue redistribution) generates a Pareto improvement in this case if com-
muters do not relocate (Arnott et al., 1994; Hall, 2015), this is not true if we consider commuters’
relocation. Moreover, since rich commuters reside downtown and poor commuters reside in the
suburbs, congestion tolling leads to an unbalanced distribution of benefits: rich commuters gain,
whereas poor commuters lose.
There are a few studies that considered both bottleneck congestion and commuters’ location
choice as in Arnott (1998).4 Gubins and Verhoef (2014) considered a (continuous space) monocen-
tric closed city with a bottleneck at the entrance to its central business district (CBD). Their model
introduced an incentive for commuters to spend time at home, which the standard bottleneck
model disregards,5 and assumed that a commuters’ house size aects their marginal utility of
spending time at home. They demonstrated that congestion tolling causes commuters to spend
more time at home and to have larger houses, leading to the physical expansion of the city.
Fosgerau et al. (2016) considered the same spatial structure as in Gubins and Verhoef (2014), but
assumed that the city is open.6 They defined the social optimum as the global maximizer of total
revenue from congestion tolling and land rents and showed that the optimal policy induces lower
density in the center and higher density farther out. In their models, however, commuters are
assumed to be homogeneous. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to systematically
analyze the model in which heterogeneous commuters choose their departure time from home
and residential location.
This studyproceeds as follows. Section 2 presents amodel inwhich heterogeneous commuters
choose their departure times from home and residential locations in a monocentric city. Sections
3 and 4 characterize equilibrium in our model without and with tolling using the properties of
complementarity problems, respectively. Section 5presents the eects of the optimal time-varying
congestion toll. Section 6 concludes the study.
3Specifically, we assume that rich commuters have a higher time-based cost per unit schedule delay (marginal schedule
delay costdividedbymarginal travel time cost). Note that this case includes situations analyzed in the literature employing
bottleneckmodels and commuter heterogeneity (e.g., Arnott et al., 1992, 1994; van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011; Hall, 2015).
4Recently, Osawa et al. (2017) extended the standard bottleneck model to consider a corridor network with multiple
bottlenecks and to allow each commuter to choose his/her job and residential location. They analytically derived
equilibrium job–location–departure-time choice patterns under a first-best transportation demand management scheme
and showed that the equilibrium pattern exhibits spatio-temoporal sorting properties.
5Vickrey (1973), Tseng and Verhoef (2008), Fosgerau and Engelson (2011), Fosgerau and de Palma (2012), Fosgerau
and Lindsey (2013), and Fosgerau and Small (2014) considered the utility of spending time at home. Note that this study
does not introduce the utility of spending time at home.
6Unlike Gubins and Verhoef (2014), Fosgerau et al. (2016) did not introduce the assumption that the marginal utility
of spending time at home depends on house size.
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2 The model
2.1 Assumptions
We consider a long narrow city with a spaceless CBD, where all job opportunities are located.
The CBD is located at the edge of the city, and a residential location is indexed by distance x from
the CBD (Figure 1). Land is uniformly distributed with unit density along a road. As is common
in the literature, the land is owned by absentee landlords.7 The road has a single bottleneck with
capacity  at location d > 0. If arrival rates at the bottleneck exceed its capacity, a queue develops.
To model queuing congestion, we employ first-in-first-out (FIFO) and a point queue, in which
vehicles have no physical length as in standard bottleneck models (Vickrey, 1969; Arnott et al.,
1993). Free-flow travel time per unit distance is assumed to be constant at  > 0 (i.e., free-flow
speed is 1=).
There are I types of commuters, each of whom must travel from home to the CBD and who
have the same preferred arrival time t at work. They dier in their income, value of travel
time, and schedule delay costs. The number of commuters of type i 2 I  f1; 2;    ; Ig, whom
we call “commuters i,” is fixed and denoted by Ni. Since the bottleneck is located at d, only
commuters who reside at x > d pass through it, whereas those who reside at x 2 [0; d] do not.
Following Arnott (1998), we denote locations Xs = fx 2 R+ j x > dg as “suburb” and locations
Xd = fx 2 R+ j x 2 [0; d]g as “downtown.” We denote the number of commuters i in the suburb
and downtown by Nsi and N
d
i (= Ni   Nsi ), respectively. If d is suciently large, all commuters
reside downtown and no commuter traverses the bottleneck. Because we are uninterested in that
case, d is assumed to be small, such that
P
k2INsk > 0.
Commuting cost ci(x; t) of commuters iwho reside at x and arrive at work at time t is expressed
as the sum of travel time cost mi(x; t) and schedule delay cost si(t   t):
ci(x; t) = mi(x; t) + si(t   t); (1a)
mi(x; t) =
8>>><>>>:ix if x 2 X
d;
i

q(t) + x
	
if x 2 Xs;
(1b)
si(t   t) =
8>>><>>>:i(t
   t) if t  t;
i(t   t) if t  t;
(1c)
where q(t) denotes the queuing time of commuters arriving at work at time t, x represents free-
7We can make the alternative assumption that land is publicly owned and that the aggregate land rent is equally
redistributed to all commuters. The results under this assumption are essentially identical to those obtained with
absentee landlords since we assume that the utility function u is quasi-linear (i.e., income elasticity of demand for land is
zero).
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flow travel time of commuters residing at x, and i > 0 is the value of travel time of commuters i.
i > 0 and i > 0 are early and late delay costs per unit time, respectively. We assume i > i for
all i 2 I so that an equilibrium in our model satisfies the FIFO property (i.e., vehicles must leave
the bottleneck in the same order as their arrival at the bottleneck). We also assume the value of
travel time i of commuters i is positively correlated to their income wi.
The utility of commuters iwho reside at x and arrive at work at time t is given by the following
quasi-linear utility function8:
u(zi(x; t); ai(x)) = zi(x; t) + f (ai(x)); (2)
where zi(x; t) denotes consumption of the nume´raire goods, ai(x) is the lot size at x, and f (ai(x))
is the utility from land consumption. We assume f (x) is a strictly increasing, concave, and
twice dierentiable function for x > 0. We also assume limx!0+ f 0(x) = 1. The logarithmic
( f (x) =  ln[a]) and the hyperbolic ( f (x) =   2x ) utility functions are examples satisfying these
assumptions.9 The budget constraint is expressed as
wi = zi(x; t) + fr(x) + rAg ai(x) + ci(x; t); (3)
where rA > 0 is exogenous agricultural rent and r(x) + rA denotes land rent at x.
The first-order condition of the utility maximization problem gives8>>><>>>: f
0(ai(x)) = r(x) + rA if ai(x) > 0;
f 0(ai(x))  r(x) + rA if ai(x) = 0;
(4)
where the prime denotes dierentiation. Since themarginal utility of land consumption is infinity
at ai(x) = 0, we must have ai(x) > 0 and
ai(x) = g(r(x) + rA); (5)
where g() is the inverse function of f 0(). This implies that lot size ai(x) is independent of
commuters’ type i as well as commuting cost (and congestion toll levels) ci(x; t). Therefore, we
denote lot size at x by a(x).
From (2), (3), and (5), we obtain the indirect utility vi(x; t) as follows:
vi(x; t) = wi   ci(x; t) +H(r(x) + rA); (6)
where H(r) = f (g(r))   rg(r). Because H(r(x) + rA) can be rewritten as f (a(x))   fr(x) + rAga(x), this
represents net utility from land consumption at x. Furthermore, sinceH0(r(x)+rA) =  g(r(x)+rA) <
0, H() is a strictly decreasing function.
2.2 Equilibrium conditions
Similar tomodels in Peer andVerhoef (2013), Gubins andVerhoef (2014), andTakayama (2015), we
assume commuters make long-run decisions about residential location and short-run decisions
8As Arnott (1998) proved, if commuters are homogeneous, congestion tolling does not aect their spatial distribution
under a quasi-linear utility function (2).
9The same utility function has been introduced by, e.g., Blanchet et al. (2016) and Akamatsu et al. (2017).
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about day-specific trip timing. In the short run, commuters iminimize commuting cost ci(x; t) by
selecting their arrival time t at work taking their residential location x as given. In the long run,
each commuter i chooses a residential location x so as to maximize his/her utility. We therefore
formalize the short- and long-run equilibrium conditions.
2.2.1 Short-run equilibrium conditions
Commuters in the short rundetermine only their day-specific arrival time t atwork, which implies
that the number Ni(x) of commuters i residing at x (i.e., spatial distribution of commuters i) is
assumed to be a given. Since commuting costs are given by (1), short-run equilibrium conditions
dier according to commuters’ residential locations. We first consider commuters residing in the
suburb (suburban commuters), who must traverse the bottleneck. The commuting cost csi (x; t) of
suburban commuters i consists of a costix of free-flow travel timedepending only on residential
location x and a bottleneck cost cbi (t) owing to queuing congestion and a schedule delay depending
only on arrival time t:
csi (x; t) = ix + c
b
i (t); (7a)
cbi (t) = iq(t) + si(t   t): (7b)
This implies that each suburban commuter chooses arrival time t so as tominimize bottleneck cost
cbi (t). Therefore, short-run equilibrium conditions coincide with those in the standard bottleneck
model, which are given by three conditions:8>>><>>>:n
s
i (t)
n
cbi (t)   cbi
o
= 0
nsi (t)  0; cbi (t)   cbi  0
8i 2 I; (8a)
8>>><>>>:q(t)
n
  Pk2I nsk(t)o = 0
q(t)  0;   Pk2I nsk(t)  0 8t 2 R+; (8b)Z
nsi (t)dt = N
s
i 8i 2 I; (8c)
where nsi (t) denotes the number of suburban commuters iwho arrive at work at time t (i.e., arrival
rate of suburban commuters i at the CBD) and cbi is the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost of
suburban commuters i.
Condition (8a) represents the no-arbitrage condition for the choice of arrival time. This
condition means that, at the short-run equilibrium, no commuter can reduce the bottleneck cost
by altering arrival time unilaterally. Condition (8b) is the capacity constraint of the bottleneck,
which requires that the total departure rate
P
k2I nsk(t) at the bottleneck
10 equals capacity  if there
is a queue; otherwise, the total departure rate is (weakly) lower than . Condition (8c) is flow
conservation for commuting demand. These conditions give nsi (t), q(t), and c
b
i at the short-run
equilibrium as functions of the number N s = [Nsi ] of suburban commuters i 2 I. This implies
that, at the short-run equilibrium, the bottleneck cost of suburban commuters i depends on N s
but not on Ni(x).
We next consider commuters who reside downtown (downtown commuters). Since these
10Note that the departure rate from the bottleneck coincides with the arrival rate of suburban commuters at the CBD.
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commuters do not traverse the bottleneck, their commuting cost cdi (x; t) is expressed as
cdi (x; t) = ix + si(t   t): (9)
Thus, all downtown commuters will arrive at t = t, and their commuting cost at the short-run
equilibrium is given by ix.
2.2.2 Long-run equilibrium conditions
In the long run, each commuter i chooses a residential location x so as to maximize indirect utility
vi(x), which is expressed as
vi(x) = yi(x) +H(r(x) + rA); (10a)
yi(x) =
8>>><>>>:wi   ix   c
b
i (N
s) if x 2 Xs;
wi   ix if x 2 Xd;
(10b)
where yi(x) denotes the income net of commuting cost earned by commuters i residing at x. Thus,
long-run equilibrium conditions are given by8>>><>>>:Ni(x)
n
vi   vi(x)
o
= 0
Ni(x)  0; vi   vi(x)  0
8x 2 R+; 8i 2 I; (11a)8>>><>>>:r(x)

1  Pk2I a(x)Nk(x)	 = 0
r(x)  0; 1  Pk2I a(x)Nk(x)  0 8x 2 R+; (11b)Z 1
0
Ni(x) dx = Ni 8i 2 I; (11c)
where vi denotes the long-run equilibrium utility of commuters i.
Condition (11a) is the equilibrium condition for commuters’ choice of residential location.
This condition implies that, at the long-run equilibrium, no commuter has incentive to change
residential location unilaterally. Condition (11b) is the land market clearing condition. This
condition requires that, if total land demand
P
k2I a(x)Nk(x) for housing at x equals supply 1, land
rent r(x)+ rA is (weakly) larger than agricultural rent rA. Condition (11c) expresses the population
constraint.
Note that the traditional bid-rent approach (Alonso, 1964; Fujita, 1989; Duranton and Puga, 2015) is
equivalent to our approach using complementarity problems, as shown in Appendix A. More precisely,
long-run equilibrium conditions (11) coincide with those of the bid-rent approach.11 Therefore,
even if we used the traditional bid-rent approach, we would obtain the same results as those
presented in this study.
Substituting (5) into (11b), we obtain r(x) as follows:
r(x) + rA =
8>>><>>>: f
0( 1N(x) ) if f
0( 1N(x) )  rA;
rA if f 0( 1N(x) )  rA;
(12)
11The equivalence between the bid-rent and our approaches has been shown in Fujita (1989, Chapter 2).
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where N(x) =
P
k2INk(x) represents the total number of commuters residing at x. It follows from
(10a) and (12) that the equilibrium conditions in (11) are rewritten as (11a) and (11c) with (10a)
and
vi(x) =
8>>><>>>:yi(x) + h(N(x)) if f
0( 1N(x) )  rA;
yi(x) +H(rA) if f 0( 1N(x) )  rA;
(13a)
h(N(x)) = H( f 0( 1N(x) )) = f (
1
N(x) )   1N(x) f 0( 1N(x) ); (13b)
where h(N(x)) = H(r(x)+rA). Since h0(N(x)) = 1N(x)3 f
00( 1N(x) ) < 0, h() is a strictly decreasing function;
that is, the net utility from land consumption decreases as the number of residents increases.
To study the spatial distribution of commuters, it is useful to rewrite the equilibriumconditions
(11a) and (11c) as follows:8>>><>>>:Ni(x)
n
vsi (N
s)   vsi (x)
o
= 0
Ni(x)  0; vsi (N s)   vsi (x)  0
8x 2 Xs; 8i 2 I; (14a)
Z 1
d
Ni(x) dx = Nsi 8i 2 I; (14b)8>>><>>>:Ni(x)
n
vdi (N
d)   vdi (x)
o
= 0
Ni(x)  0; vdi (N d)   vdi (x)  0
8x 2 Xd; 8i 2 I; (14c)
Z d
0
Ni(x) dx = Ndi 8i 2 I; (14d)8>>><>>>:v
d
i (N
d)  vsi (N s) if Ndi  0
vdi (N
d)  vsi (N s) if Nsi  0
8i 2 I; (14e)
Ndi +N
s
i = Ni 8i 2 I; (14f)
where vsi (N
s) and vdi (N
d) denote the utilities that commuters i receive from residing in the
suburb and downtown, respectively.
Conditions (14a) and (14b) are equilibrium conditions for suburban commuters’ choice of resi-
dential location x. Similarly, conditions (14c) and (14d) are those for downtown commuters’ choice
of residential location x. Conditions (14e) and (14f) are equilibrium conditions for commuters’
choice between residing in the suburb and downtown. We use these conditions to characterize
the equilibrium spatial distribution of commuters in Section 3.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Short-run equilibrium
The short-run equilibrium conditions (8) of suburban commuters coincide with those in the
standard bottleneck model, as shown above. Therefore, we can invoke the results of studies
utilizing the bottleneck model to characterize the short-run equilibrium (Arnott et al., 1994;
Lindsey, 2004; Iryo and Yoshii, 2007; Liu et al., 2015). In particular, the following properties of
the short-run equilibrium are useful for investigating the properties of our model.
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Figure 2: An example of cumulative arrival and departure curves at the short-run equilibrium
Lemma 1 (Lindsey, 2004; Iryo and Yoshii, 2007).
(i) The short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost cbi (N
s) is uniquely determined.
(ii) The short-run equilibrium number [nsi (t)] of suburban commuters arriving at time t coincides with
the solution of the following linear programming problem:
min
[nsi (t)]
Z
si(t   t)
i
nsi (t) dt s.t.   
X
k2I
nsk(t)  0;
Z
nsi (t)dt = N
s
i : (15)
Let us define (travel) time-based cost as the cost converted into equivalent travel time. Since
that cost for commuters i is given by dividing the cost by i, we say that si(t   t)=i represents
the time-based schedule delay cost of commuters i. Therefore, Lemma 1 (ii) shows that, at the
short-run equilibrium, the total time-based schedule delay cost isminimized, but the total schedule
delay cost is not necessarily minimized.
We let supp (nsi ) = ft 2 R+ j nsi (t) > 0g be the support of the short-run equilibrium number
nsi (t) of suburban commuters iwho arrive at work at t. From Lemma 1 (ii), we then have
supp (
P
i2I nsi ) = [t
E; tL]; (16)
where tE and tL denote the earliest and latest arrival times of commuters, which satisfy
tL = tE +
P
i2INi

: (17)
This indicates that, at the short-run equilibrium, a rush hour in which queuing congestion occurs
must be a single time interval (Figure 2).
Furthermore, by using short-run equilibrium condition (8a), we obtain
cbi (ti) + c
b
j (t j)  cbi (t j) + cbj (ti) 8ti 2 supp (nsi ); t j 2 supp (nsj ): (18)
Substituting (7) into this, we have the following conditions as given in Arnott et al. (1994) and
Liu et al. (2015): for any ti 2 supp (nsi ), t j 2 supp (nsj ), and i; j 2 I, 
i
i
   j
 j
! 
ti   t j

 0 if maxfti; t jg  t; (19a)
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i
i
   j
 j
! 
ti   t j

 0 if minfti; t jg  t: (19b)
These conditions indicate that the short-run equilibrium has the following properties: if
marginal time-based early delay cost of commuters i is lower than that of commuters j (i.e.,
i=i <  j= j), early-arriving commuters i (commuters i arriving at the CBD before the preferred
arrival time t) arrive at the CBD earlier than early-arriving commuters j; if the marginal time-
based late delay cost of commuters i is lower than that of commuters j (i.e., i=i <  j= j), late-
arriving commuters i (commuters i arriving after t) arrive later than late-arriving commuters j.
This occurs because commuters with a lower time-based schedule delay cost avoid queuing time
rather than a schedule delay. This result shows that, at the short-run equilibrium, commuters sort
themselves temporally on the basis of their marginal time-based schedule delay cost.
In the following analysis, we make the following assumption about marginal early and late
delay costs, which is common to the literature employing a bottleneck model with commuter
heterogeneity (Vickrey, 1973; Arnott et al., 1992, 1994; van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011; Hall,
2015).
Assumption 1. ii =  for all i 2 I.
This assumption implies that commuters with a high early delay cost also have a higher late delay
cost. Therefore, commuters are heterogeneous in two dimensions: the value of travel time i and
marginal schedule delay cost i (i).
For convenience, we call commuters with a high (low) value of travel time “rich (poor) com-
muters.” We call commuters with a low (high) marginal schedule delay cost “flexible (inflexible)
commuters.” We can then say from (19) that richer or more flexible commuters prefer to arrive
further from their preferred arrival time t to avoid queuing.
Under Assumption 1, we can explicitly obtain the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost as a
function of the numberN s = [Nsi ] of suburban commuters i. For themoment, we assume, without
loss of generality, that commuters with small i have a (weakly) higher time-based schedule delay
cost:
Assumption 2. i 1i 1 
i
i
for any i 2 Inf1g.
Then, from (19), early-arriving (late-arriving) commuters with smaller i arrive later (earlier) at
the short-run equilibrium. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, therefore, the short-run equilibrium
bottleneck cost cbi (N
s) of suburban commuters i is derived by following the procedure employed
in literature featuring bottleneck models with commuter heterogeneity (see, e.g., van den Berg
and Verhoef, 2011):
cbi (N
s) =

1 + 
8>><>>:i
Pi
k=1N
s
k

+ i
IX
k=i+1
k
k
Nsk

9>>=>>; 8i 2 I: (20)
This clearly shows that richer or more inflexible commuters incur higher bottleneck costs at the
short-run equilibrium.
Properties of the short-run equilibrium obtained above can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 1. The short-run equilibrium has the following properties.
(i) Total time-based schedule delay cost is minimized.
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(ii) Early-arriving commuters arrive at work in order of increasing marginal time-based early delay cost
(i=i). Late-arriving commuters arrive at work in order of decreasing marginal time-based late
delay cost (i=i).
(iii) The short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost cbi (N
s) of commuters i is uniquely determined. Further-
more, if Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, cbi (N
s) is given by (20).
We see from this proposition that the indirect utility (13) is uniquely determined. Therefore,
in the following subsection, we characterize the long-run equilibrium by using the properties of
the complementarity problems (14).
3.2 Long-run equilibrium
3.2.1 Suburban and downtown spatial structures
We first examine the properties of suburban and downtown spatial structures at the long-run
equilibrium using the properties of equilibrium conditions (14a), (14b), (14c), and (14d). We
therefore consider in this subsection that the suburban and downtown populations are given.
From equilibrium conditions (14a) and (14c), we see there is no vacant location between any two
populated locations, as shown in Lemma 2.
Lemma2. The long-run equilibriumnumberN(x) of commuters residing at x has the following properties:
(i) the support of N(x) is given by
supp (N) = [0;XB]; (21)
where XB denotes the residential location for commuters farthest from the CBD (city boundary).
(ii) N(x) satisfies
f 0( 1N(x) ) > r
A 8x 2 supp (N)nfXBg; (22a)
f 0( 1N(XB) ) = r
A: (22b)
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Let Nsi (x) and N
d
i (x) be the respective long-run equilibrium number of suburban and down-
town commuters i residing at x. Then, it follows from Lemma 2 that, for any xsi 2 supp (Nsi ) and
xdi 2 supp (Ndi ), indirect utilities vsi (xsi ) and vdi (xdi ) are expressed as
vsi (x
s
i ) = wi   cbi (N s)   ixsi + h(N(xsi )); (23a)
vdi (x
d
i ) = wi   ixdi + h(N(xdi )): (23b)
In addition, equilibrium conditions (14a) and (14c) give the following conditions for Nsi (x) and
Ndi (x):
vsi (x
s
i ) + v
s
j(x
s
j)  vsi (xsj) + vsj(xsi ) 8xsi 2 supp (Nsi ); 8xsj 2 supp (Nsj ); 8i; j 2 I; (24a)
vdi (x
d
i ) + v
d
j (x
d
j )  vdi (xdj ) + vdj (xdi ) 8xdi 2 supp (Ndi ); 8xdj 2 supp (Ndj ); 8i; j 2 I: (24b)
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Substituting (23) into (24) yields the following conditions: for any xi 2 supp (Nsi ), x j 2 supp (Nsj ),
and i; j 2 I, 
i    j
 
xi   x j

 0: (25)
This condition also holds for any xi 2 supp (Ndi ), x j 2 supp (Ndj ), and i; j 2 I.
This condition states that richer suburban commuters reside closer to the CBD to reduce their
free-flow travel time cost. This property also holds for downtown commuters. This implies that
suburban and downtown commuters sort themselves spatially on the basis of their value of travel time.
Furthermore, spatial distribution of suburban commuters and that of downtown commuters are
unaected by the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost cbi (N
s).
In our model, the free-flow travel time cost is more income elastic than the demand for land
since we assume that the income elasticity of demand for land is zero. Therefore, this result
is in accordance with the well-known result of traditional location models considering dierent
groups with heterogeneous income levels (Fujita, 1989), which show that rich commuters reside
closer to the CBD if the income elasticity of commuting costs is larger than the income elasticity
of demand for land.12
By using condition (25), we can obtain the spatial distribution of commuters N(x), land rent
r(x), and lot size a(x). For this, we introduce the following assumption.13
Assumption 3. i 1 > i for all i 2 Inf1g.
This means that commuters with small i are richer than those with large i.
Let Xsi and X
d
i denote the respective locations for suburban and downtown commuters i
residing nearest the CBD. It follows from (25) and Assumption 3 that suburban and down-
town commuters i reside in [Xsi ;X
s
i+1] and [X
d
i ;X
d
i+1], respectively (i.e., supp (N
s
i ) = [X
s
i ;X
s
i+1] and
supp (Ndi ) = [X
d
i ;X
d
i+1] for all i 2 I). Therefore, we have
vsi (x) = v
s
i (X
s
i ) 8x 2 [Xsi ;Xsi+1]; (26a)
vdi (x) = v
d
i (X
d
i ) 8x 2 [Xdi ;Xdi+1]: (26b)
These, together with the population constraints (14b) and (14d), lead to the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Suppose Assumption 3. Then the long-run equilibrium land rents at locations Xsi and X
d
i are
given by
r(Xsi ) + rA = rA +
IX
k=i
kNsk; r(X
d
i ) + rA = r(d) + rA +
IX
k=i
kNdk ; (27)
where r(d) + rA is the land rent at location d.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
12As discussed in Duranton and Puga (2015), with only one dimension of household heterogeneity, this (extreme)
ordered sorting is expected in equilibrium, but some mixing will occur when households are heterogeneous in two or
more dimensions (see, e.g., Behrens et al., 2014).
13This assumption ensures that “no pair of bit rent functions intersects more than once” in the suburb and downtown
when we use the bid-rent approach. As discussed in Fujita (1989, Chapter 4), this is a necessary condition for the
uniqueness of the equilibrium in the traditional residential location model.
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Substituting (27) into (26), we obtain Xsi and X
d
i as follows.
Xsi = d +
i 1X
j=1
1
 j
n
H(rA +
PI
k= j+1 kN
s
k)  H(rA +
PI
k= j kN
s
k)
o
; (28a)
Xdi =
i 1X
j=1
1
 j
n
H(r(d) + rA +
PI
k= j+1 kN
d
k )  H(r(d) + rA +
PI
k= j kN
d
k )
o
: (28b)
Recall that H(r) = f (g(r))  rg(r), and thus h(N(Xsi )) = H(r(Xsi )+ rA). Land rent r(d)+ rA at location
d is obtained from the following condition:8>>><>>>:r(d)
n
d   XdI+1
o
= 0;
r(d)  0; d   XdI+1  0:
(29)
This condition means that, if XdI+1 < d for any r(d) 2 R+, land rent at d equals the agricultural rent
rA (i.e., r(d) = 0); otherwise, r(d) is determined such that XdI+1 = d. r(d) is uniquely determined by
condition (29), because the following conditions hold:
dXdI+1
dr(d)
=
X
k2I
n
g(r(Xdk ) + r(d) + rA)   g(r(Xdk+1) + r(d) + rA)
o
< 0 if
X
k2I
Ndk > 0; (30a)
lim
r(d)!1
XdI+1 = 0; (30b)
where the second condition follows from H0() =  g() and limr!1 g(r) = 0 (lima!0+ f 0(a) = 1).
By using (26), (27), and (28), we obtain Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. Suppose Assumption 3. Then at the long-run equilibrium,
(i) the city boundary XB is given by
XB = d +
1

26666664 1IH(rA)   Xk2Inf1g
 1
k
  1
k 1

Hsk  
1
1
Hs1
37777775 ; (31)
where Hsi = H(rA +
PI
k=i kN
s
k);
(ii) the number N(x) of commuters, lot size a(x), and land rent r(x) + rA are given by
N(x) =
8>>><>>>:h
 1 i(x   d) + i Pik=2 n 1k   1k 1 oHsk + i1Hs1 if x 2 [Xsi ;Xsi+1];
h 1

ix + i
Pi
k=2
n
1
k
  1k 1
o
Hdk +
i
1
Hd1

if x 2 [Xdi ;Xdi+1];
(32a)
a(x) =
1
N(x)
8x 2 [0;XB]; (32b)
r(x) + rA = f 0(a(x)) 8x 2 [0;XB]; (32c)
where h 1() is the inverse function of h() and Hdi = H(r(d) + rA +
PI
k=i kN
d
k ).
Proof. Since XB = XsI+1 and H
s
i = H(r(X
s
i )+ rA), we have (31). (32) is obtained from the straightfor-
ward calculation of (4), (12), and (26). 
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It follows from this lemma that, for any i; j 2 I,
@XB
@Nsi
> 0;
@N(x)
@Nsi
8>>><>>>:> 0 if x 2 (X
s
j;X
s
j+1);
< 0 if x 2 (Xdj ;Xdj+1):
(33)
This shows that the city boundary moves outward as the suburban population increases. That
is, a population increase in the suburb leads to the physical expansion of the city. Furthermore, it
induces higher density and land rent at any populated suburban location and lower density and
land rent at any populated downtown location.
We see from this lemma that the long-run equilibrium spatial distribution of suburban com-
muters and that of downtown commuters are uniquely determined if Xsi and X
d
i are finite. There-
fore, we make the following assumption to ensure the uniqueness of the long-run equilibrium in
the suburb and downtown.
Assumption 4. H(r) < 1 for any r  rA.
Indeed, since Xsi and X
d
i are given by (28), they are finite under Assumption 4.
In addition, the long-run equilibrium conditions (14a), (14b), (14c), and (14d) are equivalent
to Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions of the following optimization problem:
Lemma 5. The spatial distribution [Ni (x)] (x 2 Xs) of suburban commuters is a long-run equilibrium if
and only if it is a KKT point of the following optimization problem:
max
[Ni(x)]
Z 1
d
2666664X
k2I
n
wk   kx   csk (N s) + f ( 1N(x) )
o
Nk(x)   rA
3777775dx (34a)
s.t.
Z 1
d
Ni(x)dx = Nsi 8i 2 I; Ni(x)  0 8i 2 I; 8x 2 R+: (34b)
Furthermore, the spatial distribution [Ni (x)] (x 2 Xd) of downtown commuters is a long-run equilibrium
if and only if it is a KKT point of the following optimization problem:
max
[Ni(x)]
Z d
0
2666664X
k2I
n
wk   kx + f ( 1N(x) )
o
Nk(x)   rA
3777775dx (35a)
s.t.
Z d
0
Ni(x)dx = Ndi 8i 2 I; Ni(x)  0 8i 2 I; 8x 2 R+: (35b)
Since 1N(x) equals the lot size a(x) and f
0( 1N(x) ) equals themarket land rent at location x, the objective
functions of (34) and (35) represent the total surplus
R P
k2I vk(x)Nk(x)dx+
R
r(x)a(x)N(x)dx of the
suburb and the downtown, respectively. Hence, this lemma demonstrates that the land market is
ecient in both the suburb and downtown, as in the traditional residential locationmodel (Fujita,
1989). Note that since the numberN s of suburban commuters is taken as given, Lemma 5 does
not indicate that the long-run equilibrium is ecient but instead shows that market failures in
our model are caused only by trac (bottleneck) congestion.
The results obtained above can be summarized as Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4. Then, given the numberN s of suburban commuters, the
long-run equilibrium suburban and downtown spatial structures have the following properties.
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(i) The long-run equilibrium spatial distribution of suburban commuters and that of downtown com-
muters are uniquely determined.
(ii) Among commuters residing in the suburb, those with a high value of travel time reside closer to the
CBD. Among commuters residing downtown, those with a high value of travel time reside closer to
the CBD.
(iii) Population increase in the suburb expands the city boundary outward. Furthermore, it induces
higher density and land rents at any populated suburban location, and lower density and land rents
at any populated downtown location.
(iv) The total surplus of the suburb and that of the downtown are maximized.
3.2.2 Population of suburban and downtown commuters
We next characterize the long-run equilibrium numberN s = [Nsi ] andN
d = [Ndi ] of suburban
and downtown commuters i under Assumptions 3 and 4 by using equilibrium conditions (14e)
and (14f). From (28) and Lemma 4, utilities that commuters receive from residing in the suburb
and downtown are given by
vsi (N
s) = yi   cbi (N s)   iXsi +H(rA)  
IX
k=i
k(Xsk+1   Xsk); (36a)
vdi (N
d) = yi   iXdi +H(r(d) + rA)  
IX
k=i
k(Xdk+1   Xdk ); (36b)
where Xsi and X
d
i are represented as (28). The utility dierence v
d
i (N
d)   vsi (N s) is thus given by
vdi (N
d)   vsi (N s) = cbi (N s) +
IX
k=i+1
(k 1   k)(Xsk   Xdk ) + I(XB   d) +H(r(d) + rA)  H(rA):
(37)
The dierence in utility of commuters with high bottleneck cost cbi (N
s) or small i grows. More
specifically, because the utility dierence satisfiesn
vdi (N
d)   vsi (N s)
o
 
n
vdi 1(N
d)   vsi 1(N s)
o
=
n
cbi (N
s) + i

Xsi   Xdi
o
 
n
cbi 1(N
s) + i 1

Xsi   Xdi
o
; (38)
where cbi (N
s) + i

Xsi   Xdi

denotes the commuting cost dierence between suburban and
downtown commuters i, commuters with a large commuting cost dierence have a greater utility
dierence. Since the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost cbi (N
s) is given by (20), this implies
that richer or more inflexible commuters prefer to reside downtown under Assumptions 1, 3, and
4. Indeed, if rich commuters are inflexible, they reside downtown. To see this, we consider the
case in which Assumption 3 and the following assumption hold.
Assumption 5. i 1 > i for all i 2 Inf1g.
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Under Assumptions 1 and 3–5, cbi (N
s) < cbi 1(N
s) for any N s and i 2 Inf1g; that is, the income
elasticity of commuting cost dierences is positive. Thus, we have
vdi (N
d)   vsi (N s) < vdi 1(N d)   vsi 1(N s) (39)
for anyN s and i 2 Inf1g. This implies that there exists i 2 I such that8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
vdi (N  N s) > vsi (N s) for any i < i;
vdi (N  N s)  vsi (N s) if i = i;
vdi (N  N s) < vsi (N s) for any i > i;
(40)
where N = [Ni] denotes the total number of commuters i. Because vdi (N   N s)   vsi (N s)
increases with an increase inNsi , this condition indicates that a long-run equilibrium numberN
s
of suburban commuters exists uniquely and is given by
Nsi = 0 if i < i
; (41a)
Nsi = Ni if i > i
; (41b)
Nsi =
8>>><>>>:Ni if v
d
i ([N1;    ;Ni 1; 0; 0;    ; 0]) < vsi ([0;    ; 0;Ni ;Ni+1;    ;NI]);
Ni otherwise;
(41c)
where  2 [0; 1] is uniquely determined from
vdi ([N1;    ;Ni 1; (1   )Ni ; 0;    ; 0]) = vsi ([0;    ; 0; Ni ;Ni+1;    ;NI]): (42)
Therefore, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3–5. Then the long-run equilibrium number of suburban
and downtown commuters is uniquely determined. Furthermore, at the long-run equilibrium, commuters
with a high value of travel time reside downtown and commuters with a low value of travel time reside in
the suburb.
Propositions 2 and 3 show that, under Assumptions 1 and 3–5, rich and inflexible commuters
reside closer to the CBD since rich commuters have a higher commuting cost. Note that introducing
Assumptions 3 and 5 implies that the income elasticity of commuting costs is positive and larger
than the income elasticity of demand for land. Therefore, this result is consistent with the well-
known result given by the traditional location model (Fujita, 1989).
Although we mainly focus on this type of heterogeneity to clearly demonstrate the properties
of ourmodel, in other cases, we can have dierent equilibrium spatial distributions of commuters.
As an example, we consider the opposite case: poor commuters are highly inflexible and rich
commuters are highly flexible. In this case, the bottleneck cost of poor commuters can be much
higher than that of rich commuters, such that cbi (N
s)+i(Xsi  Xdi ) > cbi 1(N s)+i 1(Xsi  Xdi ) for
someN s and i 2 I under Assumption 3 (i.e., income elasticity of commuting cost dierences is
negative). This, together with (38), implies that poor commuters can reside downtown at the long-run
equilibrium. This result occurs because commuters who are relatively rich but highly flexible are
able to traverse the bottleneck early or late to avoid queuing congestion at a low cost. This will
save them a significant amount on their lot size, with a fairly small bottleneck cost. Thus, they
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prefer to do so. Likewise, commuters who are relatively poor but highly inflexible can avoid their
incredibly costly traversing of the bottleneck by paying to reside downtown. Therefore, we can
say that, in our model, commuters sort into residing in the suburb or downtown based on their value of
travel time and their flexibility.
4 Optimal congestion toll
Studies utilizing the standard bottleneck model show that queuing time is a pure deadweight
loss. Hence, in our model, there is no queue at the social optimum, and the social optimum
can be achieved by imposing an optimal time-varying congestion toll that eliminates queuing
congestion, as shown later. This section considers the introduction of an optimal congestion toll
p(t) and characterizes equilibrium under this pricing policy.
4.1 Short-run equilibrium
Congestion toll p(t) eliminates queuing congestion.14 Thus, the commuting cost cti(x; t) of com-
muters i is given by
cti(x; t) =
8>>><>>>:si(t   t
) + ix if x 2 Xd;
cbti (t) + ix if x 2 Xs;
(43a)
cbti (t) = p(t) + si(t   t): (43b)
Superscript t describes variables under the congestion toll. Since we consider heterogeneous
commuters, congestion toll p(t) does not equal queuing time cost iq(t) at the no-toll equilibrium and is
set so that travel demand
P
i2I nsti (t) at the bottleneck equals supply (i.e., capacity) . Therefore,
short-run equilibrium conditions for suburban commuters are expressed as8>>><>>>:c
bt
i (t) = c
bt
i if n
st
i (t) > 0
cbti (t)  cbti if nsti (t) = 0
8i 2 I; 8t 2 R; (44a)
8>>><>>>:
P
i2I nsti (t) =  if p(t) > 0P
i2I nsti (t)   if p(t) = 0
8t 2 R; (44b)
Z
nsti (t) dt = N
st
i 8i 2 I: (44c)
Condition (44a) is the no-arbitrage condition for suburban commuters’ arrival time choices.
Condition (44b) denotes the bottleneck’s capacity constraints, which assure that queuing con-
gestion is eliminated at the equilibrium. Condition (44c) provides the flow conservation for
commuting demand. From these conditions, we have nsti (t), p(t), and c
bt
i at the short-run equilib-
rium as functions of the numberN st of suburban commuters i 2 I.
As in the case without the congestion toll, by invoking the results of studies employing the
bottleneck model, we have Lemma 6
14The tradable network permit scheme proposed by Akamatsu and Wada (2017) and Wada and Akamatsu (2013) has
the same eect as the optimal congestion toll. Similar schemes have been proposed by, e.g., Verhoef et al. (1997), Yang
and Wang (2011), Nie (2012), He et al. (2013), and Nie and Yin (2013).
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Lemma 6 (Lindsey, 2004; Iryo and Yoshii, 2007).
(i) The short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost cbti (N
st) under the congestion toll is uniquely determined.
(ii) The short-run equilibrium number [nsti (t)] of suburban commuters arriving at time t under the
congestion toll coincides with the solution of the following linear programming problem:
min
[nsti (t)]
X
i2I
Z
si(t   t)nsti (t) dt (45a)
s.t.
X
i2I
nsti (t)   8t 2 R;
Z
nsti (t) dt = N
st
i 8i 2 I; nsti (t)  0 8i 2 I; 8t 2 R: (45b)
Lemma 6 (ii) suggests that total schedule delay cost is minimized at the short-run equilibrium
under the congestion toll. Note that total schedule delay cost equals total commuting cost minus
total toll revenue. Hence, Lemma 6 (ii) indicates that, in the short run, the optimal congestion toll
minimizes the social cost of commuting.
From equilibrium condition (44a), we have
cbti (ti) + c
st
j (t j)  cbti (t j) + cstj (ti) 8ti 2 supp (nsti ); 8t j 2 supp (nstj ); 8i; j 2 I: (46)
Thus, the following condition is obtained by substituting (43b) into (46): for any ti 2 supp (nsti ),
t j 2 supp (nstj ), and i; j 2 I, 
i    j
 
ti   t j

 0 if maxfti; t jg  t; (47a)
i    j
 
ti   t j

 0 if minfti; t jg  t: (47b)
This condition indicates that early-arriving commuters arrive at the CBD in order of increasing
i and that late-arriving commuters arrive in order of decreasing i under the congestion toll.
Since commuters with a high marginal time-based schedule delay cost arrive closer to their
preferred arrival time at the no-toll equilibrium, imposing the congestion toll alters the arrival order
of commuters.
This result and Lemmas 1 and 6 reveal that the equilibrium bottleneck cost under the congestion toll
cbti (N
st) generally diers from the no-toll equilibrium bottleneck cost cbi (N
st)when we consider commuter
heterogeneity in the value of travel time. Indeed, we can see that the bottleneck cost at equilibrium
with tolling diers from that at the no-toll equilibrium. For this, we suppose Assumptions 1 and
5. Then equilibrium bottleneck cost cbti (N
st) under the toll is obtained in the same manner as in
(20).
cbti (N
st) =

1 + 
8>><>>:i
Pi
k=1N
st
k

+
IX
k=i+1
k
Nstk

9>>=>>; 8i 2 I: (48)
This shows that inflexible commuters have higher bottleneck costs at the equilibrium under the
congestion toll, which is fundamentally dierent from the properties of the no-toll equilibrium
bottleneck cost.
We summarize the properties of the equilibrium in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. The short-run equilibrium under the congestion toll has the following properties.
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(i) Total schedule delay cost is minimized.
(ii) Early-arriving commuters arrive at work in order of increasing marginal early delay cost (i).
Late-arriving commuters arrive at work in order of decreasing marginal late delay cost (i).
(iii) Equilibrium bottleneck cost cbti (N
st) of commuters i is uniquely determined. Furthermore, under
Assumptions 1 and 5, cbti (N
st) is given by (48).
As in the case without tolling, downtown commuters arrive at t = t, as they need not
traverse the bottleneck. That is, the commuting cost of downtown commuters i at the short-run
equilibrium under the congestion toll is given by ix.
4.2 Long-run equilibrium
Wecharacterize the long-run equilibrium spatial distribution of commuters byusing the short-run
equilibriumbottleneck cost. In the long-run, the dierence between caseswith andwithout tolling
appears only in the indirect utility of suburban commuters. Specifically, under the congestion
toll, the indirect utility vsti (x) of suburban commuters i is expressed as
vsti (x) = wi   ix   cbti (N st) +H(rt(x) + rA); (49)
where rt(x) + rA denotes the land rent at x under the congestion toll. The long-run equilibrium
conditions are thus represented as (11) with the use of (49).
Following the same procedure as in Section 3.2 reveals that the urban spatial structure at the
long-run equilibrium under the congestion toll has the same properties as those without tolling
(Propositions 2 and 3).
Proposition 5. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3–5. Then under the congestion toll, the long-run equilibrium
has the following properties.
(i) Spatial distributions of commuters are uniquely determined.
(ii) Commuters with a high value of travel time reside closer to the CBD.
(iii) The city boundary XBt, spatial distribution Nt(x) of commuters, lot size at(x), and land rent rt(x) in
the suburb and downtown have the same functional form as in the no-toll equilibrium (i.e., (31) and
(32)).
Note that this propositiondoes not suggest that the urban structure at the long-run equilibrium
with tolling coincideswith that at the no-toll long-run equilibrium. Indeed, imposing a congestion
toll can change the number of suburban and downtown commuters since it changes the short-run
equilibrium bottleneck cost. Therefore, this proposition demonstrates that dierences between the
long-run equilibria with and without tolling arise only when the long-run equilibrium number (N s and
N st) of suburban commuters changes by tolling. In the next section, we will show the eects of
tolling on the urban spatial structure by examining dierences betweenN s andN st.
Before studying the eects of tolling, we show that the social optimum is achieved by imposing
the congestion toll. We define the social optimum as the global maximizer of commuters’ total
utility subject to budget, land, bottleneck capacity, and population constraints:
max
[ni(x;t)];[zi(x;t)];[ai(x;t)]
X
i2I
"
u(zi(x; t); ai(x; t))ni(x; t) dtdx; (50a)
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s.t.
X
i2I
" n
wi   zi(x; t)   rAai(x; t)   ci(x; t)
o
ni(x; t) dtdx  0; (50b)
1  
X
i2I
Z
ai(x; t)ni(x; t)dt  0 8x 2 R+; (50c)
  
X
i2I
Z
ni(x; t)dx  0 8t 2 R; (50d)
Ni  
"
ni(x; t)dxdt = 0 8i 2 I; (50e)
ni(x; t)  0; zi(x; t)  0; ai(x; t)  0 8i 2 I; 8x 2 R+; 8t 2 R: (50f)
Then we have Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. The KKT conditions of problem (50) coincide with the short-run and long-run equilibrium
conditions under the congestion toll.
Proof. See Appendix D 
This proposition shows that the social optimum is a long-run equilibrium under the congestion
toll, which indicates that market failures are caused only by bottleneck congestion in our model.
5 Eects of congestion toll on urban spatial structure
5.1 Long-run equilibria with and without tolling
This section demonstrates that imposing the congestion toll alters urban spatial structure. As
discussed in the previous section, the dierence between the long-run equilibriawith andwithout
tolling arises when the number of suburban and downtown commuters (N s andN d) changes by
imposing the congestion toll. Therefore, to examine eects of the congestion toll, we compare the
number of suburban commuters at the long-run equilibria with and without tolling.
We denote the utilities of commuters i residing in the suburb and downtown under the
congestion toll by vsti (N
s) and vdti (N
d), respectively, which are derived from (14a)–(14d), with
the use of (49). Then under Assumptions 3 and 4, vsti (N
s) and vdti (N
d) are obtained in themanner
of (36):
vsti (N
s) = yi   cbti (N s)   iXsti +H(rA)  
IX
k=i
k(Xstk+1   Xstk ); (51a)
vdti (N
d) = yi   iXdti +H(rt(d) + rA)  
IX
k=i
k(Xdtk+1   Xdtk ); (51b)
whereXstk and X
dt
k are, respectively, residential locations for suburban and downtown commuters
i closest to the CBD, which are given by the same functional form as in the no-toll equilibrium
(i.e., (28)). Thus, vdti (N
d)   vdsi (N s) is represented as
vdti (N
d)   vsti (N s) = cbti (N s) +
IX
k=i+1
(k 1   k)(Xstk   Xdtk ) + I(XBt   d) +H(rt(d) + rA)  H(rA):
(52)
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It follows from this and (37) that
vdti (N
d)   vsti (N s)

 

vdi (N
d)   vsi (N s)

= cbti (N
s)   cbi (N s) 8i 2 I: (53)
This leads to Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4. Then for anyN s and i 2 Inf1g,
vdti (N  N s)   vsti (N s)

 

vdti 1(N  N s)   vsti 1(N s)

=

vdi (N  N s)   vsi (N s)

 

vdi 1(N  N s)   vsi 1(N s)

; (54)
if and only if there exists  such that cbti (N
s) = cbi (N
s) +  for all i 2 I.
This proposition implies that the urban spatial structure does not change by imposing the
congestion toll if cbti (N
s) = cbi (N
s) +  for all i 2 Inf1g. However, in general, this condition does
not hold when commuters are heterogeneous in their value of travel time, as discussed in Section
4.1. This means that imposing the optimal congestion toll changes the short-run equilibrium
bottleneck cost and creates incentives for commuters to relocate. Unlike Arnott (1998), therefore,
congestion tolling does alter the urban spatial structure in our model. It is, however, dicult to examine
how the urban spatial structure changes by imposing the congestion toll. Therefore, the following
subsection analyzes our model in a simple setting to elucidate the eects of tolling.
Note that the results presented thus far were obtained under the assumption that toll revenues
are not redistributed. Since the optimal congestion toll minimizes the short-run social cost of
traversing the bottleneck, bottleneck costs for all suburban commuters can be reduced. More
specifically, if policymakers can observe the type of commuters, they can redistribute toll revenue
to suburban commuters such that
cbti (N
s)   i(N s) < cbi (N s); (55)
where i(N s) denotes the toll-revenue redistribution for each suburban commuter i (type-specific
lump-sum rebate). Thus, under this toll-revenue redistribution i(N s), the following condition is
satisfied for anyN s and i 2 I:
vdti (N  N s)   vsti (N s)   i(N s) < vdi (N  N s)   vsi (N s): (56)
This indicates that if every commuter does not relocate (i.e., in the short-run), imposing congestion
toll with this toll-revenue redistribution helps all suburban commuters and hence makes residing in the
suburb more desirable. Furthermore, this and (40) indicates that this toll-revenue redistribution leads to
the physical expansion of the city under Assumptions 1 and 3–5.
5.2 A simple example
5.2.1 Theoretical analysis
We consider a simple setting to show concretely the eects of the congestion toll on urban
spatial structure. Specifically, we suppose that Assumptions 1–4 hold.15 That is, rich commuters
15Note that if Assumptions 1–4 hold, the condition in Assumption 5 is also satisfied.
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are assumed to have a higher marginal time-based schedule delay cost. This implies that rich
commuters tend to avoid a schedule delay rather than queuing time and paying the toll.
As Hall (2015) shows, this is a situation wherein congestion tolling does not alter the arrival
order of commuters and generates a Pareto improvement if every commuter does not relocate.
Indeed, it follows from (20) and (48) that the dierence between short-run equilibrium bottleneck
costs with and without tolling is non-positive for anyN s:
cbti (N
s)   cbi (N s) =

1 + 
i
IX
k=i+1
 1
i
  1
k

k
Nsk

8>>><>>>:= 0 8i  maxfsupp (N
s)g;
< 0 8i < maxfsupp (N s)g:
(57)
This shows that the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost incurred by the poorest commuters
does not change. This reflects the fact that the poorest commuters are the most inflexible and
have the highest time-based marginal schedule delay cost. That is, commuters who face no
queuing cost at the equilibrium without tolling and face no toll at the equilibrium with tolling
are the poorest ones.
We see from (57) that congestion tolling weakly decreases short-run equilibrium bottleneck
costs of all commuters. However, as we see later, congestion tolling cannot lead to a Pareto
improvement if we consider commuters’ relocation. Moreover, rich commuters gain and poor
commuters lose from imposing the congestion toll.16
We first examine the eects of tolling on urban spatial structure. It follows from (53) and (57)
that, for anyN s and i 2 I,8>>><>>>:v
dt
i (N  N s)   vsti (N s) = vdi (N  N s)   vsi (N s) 8i  maxfsupp (N s)g;
vdti (N  N s)   vsti (N s) < vdi (N  N s)   vsi (N s) 8i < maxfsupp (N s)g:
(58)
This clearly indicates that imposing the congestion toll can create incentives for commuters
to reside in the suburb. Since the long-run equilibria with and without tolling are uniquely
determined, this result leads to
Nsti  Nsi 8i 2 I: (59)
This implies that imposing the congestion toll can increase the suburban population. Furthermore, it
follows from Propositions 2 and 4 that if there exists i 2 I such that Nsti > Nsi ,
XB < XBt; (60a)
N(x)
8>>><>>>:> N
t(x) if x 2 Xd;
< Nt(x) if x 2 Xs \ supp (Nt);
(60b)
r(x)
8>>><>>>:> r
t(x) if x 2 Xd;
< rt(x) if x 2 Xs \ supp (Nt);
(60c)
where superscripts  and t describe variables at the long-run equilibria without and with tolling,
respectively. This indicates that the population increase in the suburb expands the city boundary outward
16As Takayama andKuwahara (2016) shows, essentially the same conclusion is obtained if we introduce the assumption
“i 1=i 1  i=i for any i 2 Inf1g” instead of Assumption 2.
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and induces higher (lower) density and land rents at any populated suburban (downtown) location.
This finding is in contrast to the standard results (cities becomedenserwith congestionpricing)
of traditional location models, which consider static flow congestion (Kanemoto, 1980; Wheaton,
1998; Anas et al., 1998). It also diers from the results (the urban spatial structure does not change
by tolling) obtained by Arnott (1998), who considers homogeneous commuters. This thereby
demonstrates that interactions among heterogeneous commuters may cause the physical expansion of the
city resulting from imposition of the optimal congestion toll.
We next examine changes in commuters’ utility due to the population increase in the suburb.
There exist commuters i 2 IR  fi 2 I j Ndti > 0 and Ndi > 0g who reside downtown at the long-
run equilibria with and without tolling, and their utility changes by tolling from vdi (N  N s) to
vdti (N  N st). Their dierence is obtained from (28), (36), and (51) as
vdti (N  N dt)   vdi (N  N d) =
n
H(rt(0) + rA)  H(r(0) + rA)
o
+
iX
k=2
(k 1   k) 

Xdtk   Xdk

:
(61)
Because Xdti  Xdi for all i 2 IR and rt(0) < r(0) hold if there exists i 2 I such that Nsti > Nsi , we
have vdti (N  N dt) > vdi (N  N d) for all i 2 IR. This shows that rich commuters i 2 IR gain from
the population increase in the suburb.
The poorest commuters I reside farthest from the CBD at the long-run equilibria with and
without tolling. Therefore, their utility dierence is equal to the commuting cost dierence:
vstI (N
st)   vsI (N s) =
n
cbI (N
s) + IXB
o
 
n
cbtI (N
st) + IXBt
o
: (62)
Furthermore, (20) and (48) yield
cbtI (N
st)   cbI (N s) =

1 + 
i

8>><>>:X
k2I
Nstk  
X
k2I
Nsk
9>>=>>; : (63)
Thus, we obtain vstI (N
st) < vsI (N
s) if there exists i 2 I such that Nsti > Nsi ; that is, the population
increase in the suburb harms the poorest commuters.
These results establish the following proposition.
Proposition 8. Suppose Assumptions 1–4. Then
(i) congestion tolling weakly decreases bottleneck costs of all commuters in the short-run and can
increase the suburban population in the long-run;
(ii) the population increase in the suburb expands the city boundary outward and induces higher (lower)
density and land rents at any populated suburban (downtown) location;
(iii) rich commuters i 2 IR gain and the poorest commuters I lose from the population increase in the
suburb.
The results obtained in this subsection can be summarized as follows. In the short-run,
congestion tolling reduces bottleneck costs of all commuters except those incurred by the poorest
commuters, creating incentives for downtown commuters to reside in the suburb. Furthermore,
commuters’ relocation fromdowntown to the suburb causes downtown rents to fall andutilities to
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Figure 3: Number Nsi of suburban com-
muters i at no-toll equilibrium
Figure 4: Number Nsti of suburban com-
muters i under the optimal congestion toll
rise. Since rich commuters reside downtown in this case, they are made better o by congestion
tolling if it leads to relocation. Since the poorest commuters reside farthest from the CBD,
downtown commuters’ relocation pushes them farther out from the CBD. This, together with
increased demand for traversing the bottleneck, exacerbates commuting costs (free-flow travel
time cost and schedule delay cost) of the poorest commuters.
5.2.2 Numerical analysis
We numerically analyze our model and show eects of the optimal congestion toll. In this
analysis, we assume f (a) =  ln[a] and use the following parameter values:
I = 4; d = 10 (km);  = 2 (min=km); [Ni] = [1000; 1500; 2000; 2500]; (64a)
[yi] = [300; 200; 150; 100];  = 10; rA = 200: (64b)
The values of i, i, and  are set to be consistent with the empirical result (Small, 1982) and
Assumptions 1–4.
[i] = [0:3; 0:2; 0:15; 0:1]; [i] = [0:15; 0:09; 0:06; 0:03];  = 4: (64c)
We conduct comparative statics with respect to bottleneck capacity . The no-toll equilibrium
number of commuters i 2 I is presented in Figure 3. This figure shows that downtown commuters
relocate to the suburb in order of decreasing i with increases in bottleneck capacity. They do so
because increasing  reduces bottleneck cost cbi (N
s) of all commuters, creating incentives for
downtown commuters to relocate to the suburb. This is consistent with the results presented in
Section 5.2.1.
The eects of the optimal congestion toll appear in Figures 4–7. Figure 4 presents the long-run
equilibrium number Nsti of suburban commuters i under the optimal congestion toll. Although
this result is qualitatively the same as that at the no-toll equilibrium (Figure 3), congestion tolling
changes the total number Ns =
P
i2INsi of suburban commuters, as illustrated in Figure 5. Note
that when  is small, imposition of the congestion toll does not alter Ns. This occurs because
for small , only commuters 4 reside in the suburb (i.e., commuters traversing the bottleneck
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Figure 5: Total numberNs of suburban com-
muters
Figure 6: City boundary XB
Figure 7: Utility v4 of commuters 4
are homogeneous). Thus, congestion tolling does not aect the commuting costs of suburban
commuters, as shown in Arnott (1998). Furthermore, a suburban population increase attributable
to congestion tolling leads to expansion of the city boundaryXB, as illustrated in Figure 6. That is,
imposing the optimal congestion toll causes the physical expansion of the city. Figure 7 indicates
that congestion tolling reduces the utility of commuters 4 (i.e., commuters with the lowest value
of time). That is, the poorest commuters lose from congestion tolling. We also see from Figures
5–7 that the dierence between equilibria without and with tolling increases in two ranges of 
where Ns is constant. This occurs because, in these ranges, increases in bottleneck capacity do
not alter the suburban population at the no-toll equilibrium but increase its population at the
equilibrium with tolling. These results are also consistent with those presented in Section 5.2.1.
6 Conclusion
This study has developed a model in which heterogeneous commuters choose their departure
time from home and residential locations in a monocentric city with a single bottleneck. By
using the properties of the complementarity problem, we systematically examined the spatial
distribution of commuters and the eects of time-varying congestion tolling. The results indicate
that commuters sort themselves temporally and spatially on the basis of their value of time
and their flexibility. Furthermore, imposing an optimal congestion toll alters the urban spatial
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structure. This finding diers fundamentally from the results obtained by Arnott (1998), who
considered homogeneous commuters. Our finding thus also suggests that interactions among
heterogeneous commuters change the eects of congestion tolling.
In addition, we used a simple example to demonstrate that imposing a congestion toll without
redistributing toll revenues causes the physical expansion of the city, which is opposite to the
standard results of traditional location models considering static trac flow congestion. This dif-
ference arises from the following reasons: in the traditional residential location model, imposing
a congestion toll makes commuting more expensive; in our model, however, tolling eliminates
the queuing congestion; hence, it can make commuting less expensive. We further show that,
although congestion tolling generates a Pareto improvement in this examplewhen commuters do
not relocate, it leads to an unbalanced distribution of benefits among commuters: rich commuters
gain and poor commuters lose from tolling. These results suggest that considering commuter
heterogeneity and commuters’ residential location choice is important when we examine the
ecacy of transportation policies intended to alleviate peak-period congestion.
This study made simplifying assumptions that each commuter traverses only one bottleneck
and that rich commuters are more inflexible than poor commuters. Furthermore, although we
considered the quasi-linear utility function, it is well known that the income elasticity of demand
for land is positive. Therefore, it is important to examine the robustness of our results by analyzing
a model with multiple bottlenecks,17 general heterogeneity,18 and other utility functions such as
Cobb-Douglas utility. In addition, it would be valuable for future research to investigate eects of
policies other than optimal congestion tolling, such as step tolls (Arnott et al., 1990a; Laih, 1994,
2004; Lindsey et al., 2012) and transportationdemandmanagementmeasures for alleviating trac
congestion (Mun and Yonekawa, 2006; Takayama, 2015).
A Equivalence between the bid-rent and complementarity ap-
proaches
We show that long-run equilibrium conditions (11) coincide with those of the bid-rent approach.
The condition (11a) can be rewritten as8>>><>>>:Ni(x)
n
r(x) + rA  	i(x; vi )
o
= 0
Ni(x)  0; r(x) + rA  	i(x; vi )  0
8x 2 R+; 8i 2 I; (65a)
or equivalently, 8>>><>>>:r(x) + rA = 	i(x; v

i ) if Ni(x) > 0
r(x) + rA  	i(x; vi ) if Ni(x) = 0
8x 2 R+; 8i 2 I: (65b)
	i(x; vi ) is given by
	i(x; vi ) = H
 1(vi   yi(x)); (66)
17Kuwahara (1990) and Akamatsu et al. (2015) have shown the properties of a bottleneck model with multiple bottle-
necks.
18Liu et al. (2015) proposes a semi-analytical approach for solving an equilibrium of a bottleneck model with general
heterogeneous users, which is applicable to our model.
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where H 1() is the inverse function of H(). Furthermore, since maxa(x)fyi(x) + f (a(x))   vi g=a(x) =
	i(x; vi ),
19 	i(x; vi ) can be interpreted as the bid-rent function of commuters i. This shows that
conditions in (11b), (11c), and (65a) are the equilibrium conditions of the bid-rent approach (see,
e.g., Fujita, 1989, Definition 4.2).
B Proof of Lemma 2
We can show that, for any xa; xb 2 supp (N), there is no xc 2 (xa; xb) such that N(xc) = 0, because
the indirect utilities of suburban and downtown commuters i are given by (13). Thus, we obtain
Lemma 2 (i).
Dierentiating the indirect utilities vsi (x) and v
d
i (x) with respect to location x, we have
dvsi (x)
dx
=
8>>>><>>>>:
 i + h0(N(x))dN
(x)
dx
if f 0( 1N(x) )  rA;
 i if f 0( 1N(x) )  rA;
(67a)
dvdi (x)
dx
=
8>>>><>>>>:
 i + h0(N(x))dN
(x)
dx
if f 0( 1N(x) )  rA;
 i if f 0( 1N(x) )  rA:
(67b)
Therefore, the long-run equilibrium number N(x) of commuters residing at x satisfies
f 0( 1N(x) )  rA 8x 2 supp (N): (68)
Furthermore, it follows from long-run equilibrium conditions (14a) and (14c) that N(x) also
satisfies 8>>><>>>: f
0( 1N(x) ) > rA 8x 2 supp (N)nfXBg;
f 0( 1N(XB) ) = rA:
(69)
This completes the proof.
C Proof of Lemma 3
It follows from (26) that N(x) and dN(x)dx are given by
N(x) =
8>>><>>>:h
 1(h(N(Xsi )) + i(x   Xsi )) if x 2 [Xsi ;Xsi+1];
h 1(h(N(Xdi )) + i(x   Xdi )) if x 2 [Xdi ;Xdi+1];
(70a)
dN(x)
dx
=
i
h0(N(x))
8x 2 supp (N); (70b)
19As shown in, e.g., Fujita (1989), this maximization problem defines the bid-rent function.
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where h 1() is the inverse function of h(). Hence, the population constraints (14b) and (14d) can
be rewritten as
Nsi =
Z Xsi+1
Xsi
N(x)dx =
Z N(Xsi+1)
N(Xsi )
N(x)
dx
dN(x)
dN(x)
=
Z N(Xsi+1)
N(Xsi )
N(x)
h0(N(x))
i
dN(x) =
1
i
Z N(Xsi+1)
N(Xsi )
(
1
N(x)2
f 00( 1N(x) )
)
dN(x)
=
1
i
n
 r(Xsi+1) + r(Xsi )
o
; (71a)
Ndi =
Z Xdi+1
Xdi
N(x)dx =
1
i
n
 r(Xdi+1) + r(Xdi )
o
: (71b)
Since r(XsI+1) = rA and r(X
d
I+1) = r(d) + rA, we have Lemma 3.
D Proof of Proposition 6
The KKT conditions of problem (50) are given by8>>><>>>:ni(x; t)
h
u(zi(x; t); ai(x; t)) +  fwi   zi(x; t)   rAai(x; t)   ci(x; t)g   (x)ai(x; t)   (t)   i
i
= 0
ni(x; t)  0; u(zi(x; t); ai(x; t)) +  fwi   zi(x; t)   rAai(x; t)   ci(x; t)g   (x)ai(x; t)   (t)   i  0;
(72a)8>>><>>>:zi(x; t)ni(x; t)(1   ) = 0zi(x; t)  0; ni(x; t)(1   )  0; (72b)8>>><>>>:ai(x; t)ni(x; t)

f 0(ai(x; t))   (x)   rA	 = 0;
ai(x; t)  0; ni(x; t)  f 0(ai(x; t))   (x)   rA	  0; (72c)8>>><>>>:
P
i2I
! n
wi   zi(x; t)   rAai(x; t)   ci(x; t)
o
ni(x; t) dtdx = 0
  0; Pi2I! nwi   zi(x; t)   rAai(x; t)   ci(x; t)oni(x; t) dtdx  0; (72d)8>>><>>>:(x)
h
1  Pi2I R ai(x; t)ni(x; t)dti = 0
(x)  0; 1  Pi2I R ai(x; t)ni(x; t)dt  0; (72e)8>>><>>>:(t)
h
  Pi2I R ni(x; t)dxi = 0
(t)  0;   Pi2I R ni(x; t)dx  0; (72f)
Ni  
"
ni(x; t)dxdt = 0; i  0; (72g)
where , (x), (t), and i are Lagrange multipliers.
These conditions lead to  = 1. It follows from this and lima!0 f 0(a) = 1 that condition (72c)
can be rewritten as 8>>><>>>:ni(x; t)

f 0(ai(x; t))   (x)   rA	 = 0;
ni(x; t)  0; f 0(ai(x; t))   (x)   rA  0:
(73)
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This condition is equivalent to8>>><>>>:ai(x; t) = g((x) + rA) if ni(x; t)  0;ai(x; t)  g((x) + rA) if ni(x; t) = 0: (74)
Because f (a)   a f 0(a) is monotonically increasing with increases in a, we can rewrite condition
(72a) as8>>><>>>:wi + f (g((x) + rA))   f(x) + rAgg((x) + rA)   ix   si(t   t
)   (t)   i = 0 if ni(x; t)  0;
wi + f (g((x) + rA))   f(x) + rAgg((x) + rA)   ix   si(t   t)   (t)   i  0 if ni(x; t) = 0:
(75)
Since this condition is separable with respect to t and x, we have8>>><>>>:c

i   si(t   t)   (t) = 0 if
R
ni(x; t)dx  0;
ci   si(t   t)   (t)  0 if
R
ni(x; t)dx = 0;
(76)
8>>><>>>:wi + f (g((x) + rA))   f(x) + rAgg((x) + rA)   ix   c

i   i = 0 if
R
ni(x; t)dt  0;
wi + f (g((x) + rA))   f(x) + rAgg((x) + rA)   ix   ci   i  0 if
R
ni(x; t)dt = 0:
(77)
Furthermore, conditions (72e) and (72g) can be represented as8>>><>>>:
h
1   g((x) + rA)Pi2I R ni(x; t)dti = 0;
(x)  0; 1   g((x) + rA)Pi2I R ni(x; t)dt  0; (78)
Ni  
Z (Z
ni(x; t)dt
)
dx = 0; i  0: (79)
Therefore, KKT conditions in (72) can be rewritten as8>>><>>>:c

i   si(t   t)   (t) = 0 if ni(t)  0;
ci   si(t   t)   (t)  0 if ni(t) = 0;
(80a)
8>>><>>>:(t)

  Pi2I ni(t) = 0
(t)  0;   Pi2I ni(t)  0; (80b)Z
ni(t)dt =
Z 1
d
Ni(x)dx; (80c)8>>><>>>:wi + f (g((x) + rA))   f(x) + rAgg((x) + rA)   ix   c

i   i = 0 if Ni(x)  0;
wi + f (g((x) + rA))   f(x) + rAgg((x) + rA)   ix   ci   i  0 if Ni(x) = 0:
(80d)
8>>><>>>:

1   g((x) + rA)Pi2INi(x) = 0;
(x)  0; 1   g((x) + rA)Pi2INi(x)  0; (80e)
Ni =
Z
Ni(x)dx: (80f)
This proves Proposition 6.
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